I.R.S.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT
Francis Steffan,
Petitioner 

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
Respondent

}
 


Docket No.
PETITION

1. Dispute: NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY 

2. Date and City, State: MAR 06 2017, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

3. Years: 2005-2009
 
4. Type of procedure: CONDUCT UNDER REGULAR TAX CASE PROCEDURES

5. TAX COURT PETITION ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:  

A) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan is a “U.S. citizen” when in fact Francis Steffan is NOT a “U.S. citizen” but in fact is one of the people of The State of Oregon, one of the several States of the perpetual union styled as“The United States of America,” within the organic founding document The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. (see: fact a) )    

B) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as jurisdiction was properly inquired and therefore challenged in response to several notices delivered by the IRS each inquiry was ignored and unanswered. (see: fact b) )

C) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan is a “resident” within the “United States.” As defined at 26 USC 7701(a)(9), “The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.” Then at 26 USC 7701(a)(10), “The term “State” shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.” This does not include The State of Oregon, one of the several States of the perpetual union styled as “The United States of America,” within the organic founding document The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. Further, as there is no definition within 26 USC that petitioner can discover it appears “resident” is used much as “person” is used as a mask or as a fiduciary for another which Francis Steffan has never agreed to or volunteered for. (see: fact c))

D) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan is a citizen? of the singular United states? under the 14th Amendment and ?ubject to?Title 26 taxes. Francis Steffan has not accepted the offer to become a beneficiary or fiduciary of the 14th amendment public trust. Francis Steffan has no intention of receiving any benefits or privileges from government or any of its Instrumentalities
.  Francis Steffan does not voluntarily consent to any compelled benefits or privileges from government or any of its instrumentalities and any compelled use of same is “without prejudice” Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 71.3080 [UCC 1-308]. (see: fact d))




E) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as no international maritime contract (or other contact) exists wherein Francis Steffan is in privity with the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS is acting as a third party debt collector under some undisclosed contract for some undisclosed third party. [Commissioner has Burden of proof that a contact exists to compel me with a “duty” and “obligation” to perform and if no contact is produced must provide a “liability” statute to make me “liable” to issue a Notice of Deficiency] (see: fact e))

F) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as no Federal jurisdiction exists over the location Francis Steffan dwells at or worked at per 40 U.S.C 3111 & 3112 without the Federal Government providing proper “Notice of Acceptance” filed by the Federal government with the Governor of The State of Oregon plus any and all other documents necessary under statutory requirements of 40 U.S.C 3111 & 3112 . (see: fact f))

G) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as Francis Steffan does not “reside” within any Federal Territory hence Federal Jurisdiction does not exist to make Francis Steffan “subject to” Title 26 of United States Code Title 26, Subtitle A & C. 

H) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as the Social Security Act, the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, and the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 are acts passed by Congress under the exclusive authority of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 and Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States and these laws do not apply to Francis Steffan. [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures, Rule 54 “ ‘Act of Congress’ includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.”] 

I) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming jurisdiction under assumption Francis Steffan lived within the “State” as defined at 26 USC 7701(a)(10) which does not include the 50 states of the Union when in fact Francis Steffan lives in the State of Oregon one of the several sovereign States of the perpetual union styled “The United States of America.”

J) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming authority under the assumption the IRS is a “agency” of the United States government. See (a) March 29, 1974 Federal Register page 11,572 “Congress intended to create Bureau of Internal Revenue or thought they had.” (b) Internal Revenue Manual 1100 Section 1111.2(3) “Also it can be seen that Congress had intended to establish a Bureau of Internal Revenue, or thought they had . . . In other words, ‘the office of internal revenue’ was ‘the bureau of internal revenue,’ and the act of July 1, 1862, is the organic act of today’s Internal Revenue Service.” (c) CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN, 441 U.S. 281, (1979) Footnote 23 “There was virtually no Washington bureaucracy created by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, [ 12 Stat. 432 ], the statute to which the present Internal Revenue Service can be traced.” (d) Diversified Metal Products v T-Bow Company, 

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Internal Revenue Service United States Answer and Claim #4 says “Denies that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United States Government” and (e) 26 CFR 31.6011(b)-2(b)(iv) “if services are preformed for an employer other than an employer required to file returns of the taxes imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act with the office of the United States Internal Revenue Service in Puerto Rico.” [Commissioner has Burden of proof that the Internal Revenue Service is an “agency” of the United States Treasury Department of Washington, D.C. (not the Treasury Department of Puerto Rico) to have jurisdiction to issue a Notice of Deficiency] (see: fact j))

K) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in operating under color of authority representing the Government of the United States and are in reality a “revenue agent” of a foreign principal. Revenue Agent is defined at 27 CFR § 26.11, “Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico” 

L) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error since aside from places designated as official United States Ports of Entry, the President of the United States (or authorized delegate) has not created or designated “revenue districts” within the sovereign lands of the several states of the Union under the authority of 26 USC §7621 and Executive Order #10289. Francis Steffan does not live within an Internal Revenue District to become “subject to” Title 26 Subtitle A & C taxes. 

M) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error since 26 CFR § 601.101 says IRS personnel have jurisdiction for examination and collection only within internal revenue districts and Francis Steffan does not dwell within an Internal Revenue District. 

N) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as Francis Steffan is not made “liable” for personal income tax by 26 USC 1, therefore if Congress did not create the “liability” the IRS regulations 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 can not create any legal “liability”. 

O) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error since Francis Steffan is not a “fiduciary,” “accommodation party” nor volunteers surety for any fictional entity whatsoever.

P) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as Francis Steffan is one of the people of The State of Oregon, a sovereign State of the perpetual Union styled “The United States of America” and has the protected Right, Article I, Section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution, to enter into a private contact within the private sector contracting to exchange his labor, which is private property, for equal compensation without impairment. 

Q) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in making an incorrect legal determination that Francis Steffan was classified as a “taxpayer.” Francis Steffan has made the legal determination that Francis Steffan is a “non-taxpayer.” 

R) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in issuing a Notice of Deficiency before the required “assessment” was made as required per 26 CFR 601.103(a). 

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S) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as they have no authority to issue a Substitute for Return defined at IRM Exhibit 20.1.1.6-8  “Dictionary of Key Terms” in regards to Form 1040, 1040A or 1040X Substitute for Return per IRM Section 5.1.11.9 “IRC 6020(b) Authority.” (see: fact s))

T) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in determining “gross receipts” is the same as “taxable income” or “income” as shown by these Supreme Court cases which define “income”. Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921), the US Supreme Court held that, “...the word ‘income’ has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918), the US Supreme Court stated, “Certainly the term 'income' has no broader meaning in the Revenue Act of 1913 than in that of 1909…” Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), the US Supreme Court stated, “Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of ‘income,’ it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.” Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921), the US Supreme Court held that, “The word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court”. Amendment XVI of the United States Constitution states, “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” As the supreme court has stated “income” is “something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.” By all reason, income may be “derived” from wages (or other sources) but is NOT the subject it is derived from anymore than gasoline derived from a crude oil IS crude oil.

U) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as information they rely on to create the Notice of Deficiency is unverified hearsay and IRS Agents under Rules of Evidence Rule 602, “Lack of Personal Knowledge,” have no personal knowledge in this matter. 

V) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error as there is no statute anywhere in Subtitle A and/or Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code which makes Francis Steffan liable for the tax imposed in 26 U.S.C. 1 or 26 U.S.C. 871. 

W) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error when referring to Francis Steffan as an AKA. Francis Steffan is petitioners God given name provided to me by my natural mother and father.

X) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in sending a Notice of Deficiency without having the delegated authority from the Secretary of the Treasury to “determine” that there is a deficiency under 26 U.S.C. 6212. 

Y) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in repeatedly refusing to respond to legitimate written inquiries concerning numerous notices in an effort to properly comprehend and perhaps understand the vague and incomplete notices sent to petitioner. As the issuer 

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of the notices it is a denial of substantive due process to refuse to respond to legitimate inquiry specifically addressing the content of the notices in order to comprehend the claims against petitioner. What the respondent engages in is akin to a man twice your size demanding you give him money and when you ask him who are you? Why do you demand money? And he just tells you to shut up and give me the money, or else.

Z) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in repeatedly refusing to respond to legitimate written inquiries concerning numerous notices in an effort to properly comprehend and perhaps understand the vague and incomplete notices sent to petitioner. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents as the issuer of notice have a duty to respond to legitimate inquiries to those notices and to purposely refuse to do so can only be equated to fraud and fraud is not only a tort and possibly a crime it is certainly evidence of bad faith.

AA) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in purportedly generating a “substitute for return” under the authority of IRC 6020(b) to Francis Steffan as the enforcement regulations for IRC 6020(b) only apply to taxable activities regulated through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to which Francis Steffan is in no way engaged.

BB) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in purportedly generating a “substitute for return” under the authority of IRC 6020(b) as the only way this could be generated through the IRS computer system for Francis Steffan is to enter knowingly inaccurate information for the sole purpose of fraudulently creating the illusion of a tax liability that does not exist which is a clear indication of fraud and absolutely bad faith.

CC) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error by not providing Francis Steffan a copy of the actual purported “substitute for return” return that was purportedly generated and signed under penalty of perjury as required at 26 U.S.C. § 6065 as the basis for the purported deficiencies. Without Francis Steffan being able to examine the document which is the basis for the claims made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents has made it impossible for Francis Steffan to determine the legitimacy of the claims. This is akin to a stranger walking up to you and claiming you owe him $50,000 now pay up or else without providing any documentation of liability.

DD) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error by not providing Francis Steffan a copy of Form 13496, IRC section 6020(b) Certification. However, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service through his agents would still be in error even if form 13496 was provided as that “certification” subscription has no penalties of perjury as part of  form 13496 as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6065.

EE) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error by not providing Francis Steffan a copy of the IMF MCC Transcript Complete that corresponds to petitioner as has been requested by Francis Steffan in order to discover and correct errors that are necessarily present can only be equated with fraud and bad faith.

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FF) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming Francis Steffan is a man liable for “income tax” as there is no law that applies to Francis Steffan in his true and correct nature to make Francis Steffan subject or liable for “income tax.” (see: fact e) )

GG)  COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming Francis Steffan is a “person,” “individual,” “human,” “human being,” ”natural person” or any other corporal or legal or other fiction. Francis Steffan is a man made by the God of Abraham, Issac and Jacob in the image of That God as declared within the Holy Bible at Genesis 1: 26-28 

HH)  COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE through his Agent's error in presuming Francis Steffan has voluntarily agreed to be fiduciary and/or surety in anyway at anytime concerning any relationship with any fictional entity or otherwise.  Francis Steffan, one of “the people,” is a beneficiary of the trust relationship created by the Constitution of The State of Oregon, one of the several States of The United States of America, a perpetual Union, as styledd in The articles of Confederation and through that trust relationship with the State of Oregon trust Francis Steffan, one of “the people,” is also a beneficiary to the Constitution of [for] the United States, a perpetual union, and Francis Steffan at all times instructs and demands the fiduciaries, in whatever capacity I find them, to execute the trust on my behalf for my benefit; I at no time consent to be surety in any way whatsoever. 


6. STATE THE FACTS UPON WHICH YOU RELY: 

a) Within the United States Constitution in the fourteenth amendment “United States” is referred to in the singular as an separate entity from the several States of the perpetual union “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States...nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction...” The wording is in stark contrast to the “United States” referred to within the thirteenth amendment which is referred to in the plural “...shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Further, under the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, one of “The Organic Laws of The United States of America” as found at Volume 18 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as enacted by the forty-third Congress (A.D. 1873-1875) and published by the Government Printing Office in A.D. 1878.  Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. Article I. The styled of this Confederacy shall be "The United States of America." Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”
"The United States of America" is the "styled" or phrase that was used to describe the Union formed legally by those Articles among the several sovereign States. The Articles clearly distinguished "United States of America" from "United States" in Congress assembled. The States formally delegated certain powers to the federal government, which is clearly identified in those Articles as the "United States". Therefore, the "United States of America" now refers to the fifty sovereign States of the perpetual 

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Union, and the term "United States" refers to the federal government. In addition, the supreme court has ruled there is more than one “United States,” “The term 'United States' may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution,” Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt 324 U.S. 652 (1945) 

b)  “No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction” Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S. Ct. 768. “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be ‘assumed’, it must be proved to exist.” Stuck v. Board of Medical Examiners,94 Cal2d 751 “The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a countrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” Blackmer v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. at 437, 52 S.Ct. at page 254 “Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies and where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity..” [City Street Improv Co. v. Pearson, 181 C 640,185 P. (1962); O’Neil v. Dept. of Professional & Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 393, 46 P2d 234]. “Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted.” Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York37 F Supp. 150. 

c) As there appears to be no definition within 26 USC for “resident,” therefore, as dealings between States of the perpetual union are considered “foreign” petitioner will rely on the definition from international law; RESIDENT, international law. The resident does not represent the prince's person in his dignity, but only his affairs. His representation is in reality of the same nature as that of the envoy; hence he is often termed, as well as the envoy, a minister of the second order, thus distinguishing only two classes of public ministers, the former consisting of ambassadors who are invested with the representative character in preeminence, the latter comprising all other ministers, who do not possess that exalted character. This is the most necessary distinction, and indeed the only essential one. Vattel liv. 4, c. 6, 73. Further, based upon Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916) where Brushaber identified himself as a Citizen of New York State and nobody challenged that claim after the decision against Brushaber the Treasury Department issued a Treasury Decision expressly cited the Brushaber decision, and it identified Frank Brushaber as a “nonresident alien” and the Union Pacific Railroad Company as a “domestic corporation” as it was chartered in “Utah” before it was a State of the Union. 

d) It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) - We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own ....U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) - One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the United States. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (17 Am. R. 738); McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507; In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443.McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323 (1883) - That there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities of one are not the same as the other is well established by the decisions of the courts of this country. Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236 (1927) - The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens. [See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).] Instead, this

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provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship. Jones v. Temmer, 829 F.Supp. 1226 (USDC/DCO 1993) – Also see: 6(a)

e) The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1 attempt to create a specific liability for all “citizens of the United States” and all “residents of the United States”. However, those regulations correspond to IRC section 1, which does not create a specific liability for taxes imposed by subtitle A. “[A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959) 

f)  40 U.S.C 3111 & 3112

g) see: 6-a, b, c & d

h) see: 6-a, b, c, d, f & g

i) The only position created by 31 U.S.C 301 which is the organizational and administrative code for the “Department of the Treasury”concerning the “Internal Revenue Service” is “an Assistant General Counsel who shall be the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service.” There is no reference to the creation of the “Internal Revenue Service.” At footnote 23 in the case of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court admitted that no organic Act for the IRS could be found. Since there was no organic Act creating it, IRS is not a lawful organization. From 27 CFR 26.11 which is the enforcement regulation for 26 U.S.C 6301 which states, “The Secretary shall collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws. “Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. Secretary or his delegate. The Secretary or any officer or employee of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico duly authorized by the Secretary to perform the function mentioned or described in this part. 

j) 5.1.11.6.7 (04-23-2014) IRC 6020(b) Authority. The following returns may be prepared, signed and executed by revenue officers under the authority of IRC 6020(b): Form 940, Employer’s Annual Federal Unemployment Tax Return, Form 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form 943, Employer’s Annual Tax Return for Agricultural Employees, Form 944, Employer's Annual Federal Tax Return, Form 720, Quarterly Federal Excise Tax Return, Form 2290, Heavy Highway Vehicle Use Tax Return, Form CT-1, Employer’s Annual Railroad Retirement Tax Return, Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income. Francis Steffan is not an “employer,”  Francis Steffan is not engaged in any activity that is subject to an excise tax, Francis Steffan is not engaged in any Heavy Highway Vehicle Use,  Francis Steffan is not involved in any partnership.

k) It has never been nor is the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be a “citizen” of the singular “united states” as set forth in the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution. 

l)  It has never been nor is the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be a “united states person” in anyway shape or form for any reason at any time.

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m)  It has never been nor is the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to “reside” within the singular “united states,” one of its “states”, districts or territories in anyway shape or form for any reason at any time.

n)  It has been and is the intention and will of the man Francis Steffan to be “one of the People” of the State of Oregon, one of the several sovereign States of the perpetual union styled “The United States of America.”

o) The man, Francis Steffan is a beneficiary of the trust relationship between ?he People,?of which he is one, and the government created by the trust document ?onstitution of The State of Oregon?and at all times demands the trust be executed in his favor for his benefit. The man, Francis Steffan, as one of The People of The State of Oregon is also a beneficiary of the trust relationship created by the constitution for the United States of America through The State of Oregon inclusion in the perfected trust relationship created between the several sovereign States of the perpetual union known as The Constitution for the United States of America.

p) It has never been, nor is now, the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be fiduciary in anyway for any person or other fiction for any reason under any circumstance whatsoever.  

q)  It has never been, nor is now, the intention or will of the man Francis Steffan to be or provide by any means surety in any trust relationship or otherwise. 

r) Francis Steffan is not a “taxpayer” as defined within 26 U.S.C.

s) Francis Steffan is only a man created by and in the image of The God of Abraham, Issac and Jacob as stated in the Holy Bible (KJV) at Genesis 1: 26-28.

t)  The man, Francis Steffan has the Right to freely exercise his religion and the federal government is forbidden to prohibit that free exercise. Constitution of the United States, Amendment I, congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;...?and the Constitution of The State of Oregon Article I, Section 2. All men shall be secure in the Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. 3. No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religeous [sic] opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.?Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.?Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436

u) The man, Francis Steffan is not a person. All men are created equal in right, persons are not created equal. A person may purchase and own another person. The Constitution for the United States of America declares in part at the Fourth Amendment (sixth original article): the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated? It is self evident, people possess persons?as they would houses, papers and effects, persons are not The people. Instead, persons are attributes or capacities of people.  people?are real and primary; persons are relational, derivative and/or secondary; therefore I am not a person. Person derives from the Latin persona, an actors mask, men combined wearing the mask of a legal entity create a person, a singular man wearing the 

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mask of a ?egal entity?is known as a ?atural person?or an ?ndividual.?In Roman civil law jus personarum did not mean law of persons, or rights of people, but law of status, or condition. 

v) The man, Francis Steffan is not an individual.

w) The man, Francis Steffan is not human or a human being and withholds consent to being classified as a human and/or human being. The etymology of the word(s) strongly evidence that, human is another derivative of a man made in the image of God, but not the man, much as person is derivative of a Holy Bible at Genesis 1: 26-28 man: Human (adj.) mid-15c., humain, humaigne, human, from Old French humain, umain (adj.) ?f or belonging to man?(12c.), from Latin humanus ?f man, human. Human (n.)  human being, 1530s, from human (adj.). 

x) Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents continue to fail to responded to ANY of numerous legitimate inquiries to their notices. They have instead referred to my inquiries as arguments deemed them frivolous and refused to provide any answers to any questions all regarding notices they initiated. Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately?" U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F2d 997, 299-300

y)  Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents continue to fail to provide requested documentation such as Individual Master File MCC TRANSCRIPT-SPECIFIC (IMF) that they rely on for the claims they make against petitioner. "Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation." Leigh v. Loyd, 244 P.2d 356, 74 Ariz. 84-(1952)

z)  Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents claim they have made and issued petitioner a 6020(b) substitute for return yet they have failed to provide the actual subscribed by the Secretary return to petitioner. "Where relation of trust or confidence exists between two parties so that one places peculiar reliance in trustworthiness of another, latter is under duty to make full and truthful disclosure of all material facts and is liable for misrepresentation or concealment?" Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 49 Ariz. 34-(Ariz. 1937)


aa)  Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents claim they have made and issued petitioner a 6020(b) substitute for return yet the enforcement regulations, 27 CFR Part 53 & 70, corresponding to the 6020(b) claimed substitute for return only apply to taxable activities exclusively regulated through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

bb) Petitioner is not engaged, nor has been, in any activities regulated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

cc)  Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents are misapplying statutory law to fraudulently create a liability where no liability exists in reality or law.

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dd)  A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee.?Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959) 

ee) All petitioners dealings that involve compensation are done on an equal value exchange with no gain or profit and are done by contractual obligation. Article I, Section 10, Constitution for the United States of America. "...no state shall enter into...law impairing the obligation of contracts." The States of the perpetual union are forbidden to make  law impairing the obligation of contracts and there is no provision within The Constitution for the United States of America granting the federal government the power to make law impairing the obligation of contracts therefore, to exercise such power is unconstitutional.

ff) Petitioner, Francis Steffan is not a employer.

gg) Petitioner, Francis Steffan is not a employee.

hh) Petitioner, Francis Steffan is not a withholding agent.

ii) Petitioner, Francis Steffan holds no business license.

jj) Petitioner, Francis Steffan has no income as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States:  There can be no doubt that the word ["income"] must be given the same meaning and content in in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the Act of 1913. When to this we add that in Eisner v Macomber, supra, a case arising from the same Income Tax Act of 1916 which is here involved, the definition of "income" which was applied was adopted from Stratton's Independence v Howbert, supra, arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, with the addition that it should include "profit gained through the sale or conversion of capital assets", there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.?Merchants' Loan & Trust Co v Smietanka (1921), 255 US 509.; "The claim that salaries, wages, and compensation for personal services are to be taxed as an entirety and therefore must be returned by the individual who has performed the services which produce the gain is without support... it is not salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services that are to be included in gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services." Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); "There is a clear distinction between `profit' and `wages', or a compensation for labor. Compensation for labor (wages) cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word `profit', as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment -- a different thing altogether from the mere compensation for labor." Oliver v. Halstead, 86 S.E. Rep 2nd 85e9 (1955);  "... whatever may constitute income, therefore, must have the essental feature of gain to the recipient. This was true when the 16th Amendment became effective, it was true at the time of Eisner v. Macomber Supra, it was true under Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1938, and it is likewise true under Section 61(a) of the I.R.S. Code of 1954. If there is not gain, there is not income ... Congress has taxed income not compensation." Conner v. U.S., 303 F Supp. 1187 (1969); and INCOME. The gain which proceeds from property, labor, or business; it is applied particularly to individuals; the income of the government is usually called revenue.  Bouviers law dictionary 1856. 

Page 11 of 12

kk)  Commissioner of internal revenue service through his Agents have acted and continue to act in Bad Faith.  Bad Faith: The opposite of "good faith," generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. Hilgenberg v. Northup, 134 Ind. 92, 33 N. E. 780; Morton v. Immigration Ass'n, 79 Ala. 617; Coleman v. Billings, 89 111. 191; Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 South. 66, 61 L. R. A. 274; Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. 174; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Trust Co., 73 Fed. 653, 19 C. C. A. 310, 38 L. R. A. 33, 70; Insurance Co. v. Edwards, 74 Ga. 230.

www.ustaxcourt.gov


















Page 12 of 12


All documents posted here are only for educational purposes and not to be construed "legal advice." The postings are simply to let AVRN viewers see what I am doing.

AFFIDAVIT OF FACT

Francis Steffan
Petitioner  

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
Respondent

}

DOCKET NO.

Comes now, Francis Steffan, who does affirm and make the following true and correct statements that I have intimate and particular cognition of and do in fact believe.

I was a child of ten (1971) when the social security administration issued the “social security number” to be associated with a name that appeared to be my name.

I did in the 1990’s contact the social security administration to cancel the number they associate with a name that appears to be mine and they refused.

As evidenced to me by the social security administration the assigned associated number, and card, belongs to the social security administration not me.

I refuse and deny any contractual or fiduciary obligation to any man or entity based upon the issuance of a “social security number,” or any other reason, and refuse and deny to be, or offer any surety based on any reason including, but not limited to, the issuance of “social security number,” to a name that appears to be my name.

Any use or presentment of the “social security number” has been done by necessity, under duress and at arms length with all rights reserved and has never been presented with the intention to evidence or imply any entanglement, association, subjugation or affiliation in any way whatsoever with Washington D.C., the federal government or the united states (singular).

STATE OF OREGON )

COUNTY OF JACKSON )

I, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County, in said State, hereby certify that Francis Stefan whose name is signed to the foregoing instrument, and who is known to me, acknowledged before me on this day that, being informed of the contents of the instrument, he, executed the same voluntarily on the day the same bears date.

Given under my hand this ____ day of __________, 2017. My Commission Expires: ______________.

Notary Public_________________________

All documents posted here are only for educational purposes and not to be construed “legal advice.” The postings are simply to let AVRN viewers see what I am doing.

AFFIDAVIT OF FACT

Francis Steffan
Petitioner  

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
Respondent

}

DOCKET NO.

Comes now, Francis Steffan, who does affirm and make the following true and correct statements that I have intimate and particular cognition of and do in fact believe.

Francis Steffan is not a employer.

Francis Steffan is not a employee.

Francis Steffan is not a withholding agent.

Francis Steffan holds no business license.
Francis Steffan is not engaged, nor has been, in any activities regulated by or taxable through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

Francis Steffan is only a man created by and in the image of The God of Abraham, Issac and Jacob as stated in the Holy Bible (KJV) at Genesis 1: 26-28.

It has been and is the intention and will of the man Francis Steffan to be “one of the People” of the State of Oregon, one of the several sovereign States of the perpetual union stiled “The United States of America.”

STATE OF OREGON )

COUNTY OF JACKSON )

I, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County, in said State, hereby certify that Francis Stefan whose name is signed to the foregoing instrument, and who is known to me, acknowledged before me on this day that, being informed of the contents of the instrument, he, executed the same voluntarily on the day the same bears date.

Given under my hand this ____ day of __________, 2017. My Commission Expires: ______________.

Notary Public_________________________

=======================================================

                                              UNITED STATES TAX COURT
Francis Steffan ,
Petitioner  

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
Respondent
}

Electronically Filed

Docket No.

MEMORANDUM

MOTIONS I EXPECT TO MAKE: 

Motion to strike purported 6050(b) “substitute for return” from evidence. Respondent has intentionally submitted to Petitioner and the court documents containing false statements misrepresenting the contents of 26 USC Sec. 6651(g)(2) and has failed to comply with 26 USC Sec. 6065 making the return a nullity.
Motion for summury judgement with prejudice. 
Motion for penalty for frivolous tax returns 26 U.S. Code § 6702. Respondent has intentionally submitted to Petitioner and the court documents containing false statements misrepresenting the contents of 26 USC Sec. 6651(g)(2) and has failed to comply with 26 USC Sec. 6065 making the return a nullity and “The return is subject to the frivolous return penalty under section 6702.”

PETITIONER HAS SENT RESPONDENT STIPULATIONS

QUESTION: Does IRS have lawful jurisdiction over Francis Steffan  and does Francis Steffan  have a lawful federal tax liability under US law.

SHORT ANSWER: No. IRS Commissioner has misapplied statute, ignored supreme court rulings, targeted Petitioner for political purposes and his associations with certain people and perpetrated fraud in order to create the illusion of a federal tax liability.  

STATEMENT OF FACTS: IRS commissioner through his delegates pursued a tax fraud investigation against Petitioner to which they found no fraud and ended the investigation. In the letter informing Petitioner that the fraud investigation was being closed with no fraud found it also stated that IRS commissioner through his delegates could investigate other matters pertaining to Petitioner, which a few months later did just that. 

Respondent cites Petitioner's political association with a  Roy Bendshadler in their paperwork to Petitioner as implying that Petitioner's, unrelated to tax issues, association somehow justifies targeting Petitioner. Petitioner was in no way involved in  Roy Bendshadler's tax case or any activities associated with the details of that case nevertheless Respondent persists in this political tactic. 

If Petitioner was to pursue a guilt by association against Respondent I may quote IRS tax examiner Thomas Sheehy, “John Koskinen. He got a lot of flak for giving increased scrutiny to these Tea Party groups. Conservatives got really mad at him, he was so cool though because he deleted all the emails, so they could not hold any evidence against him.”Yeah, I don’t give a s**t if that is a crime for doing that.””Unfortunately, I am not allowed by the bylaws of my union to go against the constitution.” “Yeah its not easy to get fired. We have union protections.” Or perhaps former IRS official Lois Lerner and her deputy asking a federal court to keep their testimonies in the Tea Party targeting case private forever, over fear of death threats and potential harm to their families if the documents go public. People do not fear death threats because they have been acting properly and lawfully. If there is any question if their action were proper the United States Attorney General stated that the prejudicial treatment of a constitutionally conservative group was “based solely on their viewpoint or ideology.” He also went on to state, “The IRS’s use of these criteria as a basis for heightened scrutiny was wrong and should never have occurred,” and that, “It is improper for the IRS to single out groups for different treatment based on their names or ideological positions.” I would presume it would also be improper to single out particular people for their ideological positions. The settlements involved payments to the plaintiffs and an apology from Respondent. Respondent does in fact have a long, publically known, history of improper targeting of people based on their viewpoint or ideology. The US tax court is no stranger to criminal behavior among its ranks either as judge Diane Lynn Kroupa demonstrated with her conviction of conspiracy to defraud the United States, judge Kroupa worked for Respondent prior to becoming a US Tax court judge. Senior tax court judge James S. Halpern is not only a colleague of a criminal, he was also employed by Respondent for three years. If Petitioner was allowed to use the same standard Respondent is allowed to use to target him, Petitioner would be justified to assert he will get no due process from ex employees of Respondent who associate with criminals.

Given the true wealth of petitioner (greatly inflated in Respondent's claims), lack of public notoriety, cost involved in perusing Petitioner and Respondent's history, one can only conclude Respondent's targeting and pursuance of Petitioner is politically motivated based on Petitioner's viewpoint and/or ideology. Bad faith?  

Petitioner has requested documented evidence from Respondent since the first notice they sent him including, but not limited to, the IMF MCC Transcript Complete (master file). The IMF MCC Transcript Complete (master file) is used to, “validate an individual's taxes...,” and that it is “necessary to assess the taxes...” and is “...an application that receives data from an array of sources to aid the IRS with regard to those tax return submissions.” Respondent has refused to provide requested documentation and has continuously mis-characterized my evidentary document requests and questions regarding information provided in notices sent to Petitioner by Respondent as frivolous “arguments.”

26 U.S. Code Sec. 7206 Withholding, falsifying, and destroying records states that, “Any person who-

(5)(B)Receives, withholds, destroys, mutilates, or falsifies any book, document, or record, or makes any false statement, relating to the estate or financial condition of the taxpayer or other person liable in respect of the tax; ...shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” [emphasis added]

Respondent waited nearly a year and a half since Petition was filed to start sending boxes of documents, none of which is what I requested, demanded I meet them on three days noticed with the included threat of motioning for a dismissal.

Petitioner attempted to reschedule the meeting in Medford Oregon but was refused, Respondent admitted that the meeting was on short notice.

26 USC Sec. 6065 states in part, “...any return, declaration, statement, or other document required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall contain or be verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.”

Page 2 of 11

26 CFR Sec. 1.6065-1 Verification of returns. “(a) Persons signing returns. If a return, declaration, statement, or other document made under the provisions of subtitle A or F of the Code, or the regulation thereunder, with respect to any tax imposed by subtitle A of the Code is required by the regulations contained in this chapter, or the form and instructions, issued with respect to such return, declaration, statement, or other document, to contain or be verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, such return, declaration, statement, or other document shall be so verified by the person signing it.”

The sixth circuit court stated in its decision, “A return that fails to meet the requirements of section 6065 also fails the fourth prong of  a well established four prong test used to determine a return’s validity, known as the substantial compliance standard.” Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, aff’d per curiam, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986).

The 7th circuit court stated in its decision, “...the Commissioner [Respondent] asserted that the forms 1040 taxpayer and his wife submitted were not “returns” because the verification requirement of section 6050 of the code was not satisfied, as the portion of the jurat stating that the declaration was being made “[u]nder penalties of perjury” was crossed out on both forms.” Morgan (william J.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 869 F.2d 1495 (7th Cir. 1989) [added]
If any “return” or thing being purported as a return is not subscribed under penalty of perjury that “return,” if allowed to be submitted as a “return” would defeat 26 U.S. Code Sec. 7206 (1) creating an uneven playing field, a prejudicial process where Petitioner is held to a higher standard of truthfulness than Respondent and would also offer Petitioner no protection or redress against false or fraudulent evidence and would also deny Petitioner Due Process, fair procedures, provided in the fifth amendment to the United States constitution and Article I, Section 10, Constitution of the State of Oregon.

26 USC Sec. 6702 provides that to be subject to the frivolous return penalty an individual needs to file what purports to be a tax return, but not that the documents be a valid return. See Holker v. United States, 737 F.2d 751, 752 (8th Cir. 1984); Davis v. United States, 742 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1984).

In Office of Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service Memorandum, Number: 200451042, Release Date: 12/17/04, the Chief Counsel Advises within their conclusions, “The taxpayer’s return fails the requirement that it must be signed under penalties of perjury. Therefore, the return is not valid and can be treated as a nullity.” And, “The return is subject to the frivolous return penalty under section 6702.”

Altered Jurats TL-N-5970-9733. If a taxpayer fails to comply with section 6065 of the Code by submitting a “return” without the executed penalties of perjury statement, that return is a nullity. Lucus v. Pilliod Lumber Co. , 281 U.S. 245, 50 S. Ct. 297, 74 L. Ed. 829 (1930). For example, in Hettig v. U.S. , 845 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1988) the court found a failure to submit a return under penalties of perjury because the taxpayers struck the words “under penalties of perjury.” If Respondent is filing “returns” for Petitioner in substitute of a Petitioner filed “return,” and these “substitute returns” “are treated as returns filed by petitioners…” then the same requirements of being held under the penalties of perjury, to the same extent as Petitioner must be true or Respondent could lie with impunity which is a denial of due process, as in being inherently unfair to excuse requirements for one party and not the other performing the same act, a denial of equal protection under the law.


Page 3 of 11

Petitioner was sent a notice of deficiency based upon a 6020(b) substitute for return and the IMF MCC Transcript Complete. Both those documents have been withheld from Petitioner by IRS commissioner through his delegates. 

The corresponding enforcement / enactment regulations for 26 USC Sec. 6020 are found at 27 CFR Part 53 - MANUFACTURERS EXCISE TAXES - FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION and 27 CFR Part 70 - PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Petitioner is not, nor has been engaged in the regulated and taxable activities being regulated within 27 CFR nor consented to be shown in that light. 

27 CFR is not public law.

Correspondence, dated March 06, 2017 respondents “answer,” the form listed in the deficiency is “1040.” 

Form 1040 may not be prepared, signed and executed by revenue officers under the authority of IRC 6020(b) [IRM 5.1.11.6.7.]   

Form 13496 may not be prepared, signed and executed by revenue officers under the authority of IRC 6020(b) [IRM 5.1.11.6.7.]  

IRS states, on form 13496 (rev 02-2009) subscribed, not under penalty of perjury, by revenue agent Michael Sumner [ID# 1001721850], dated 12/01/2016, “Pursuant to section 6651(g)(2), this certification, with attachments, shall be treated as the return filed by the taxpayer for purposes of determining the amount of the additions to tax under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 6651(a).” [emphasis added]

Section 6651(g)(2) actually states, “such return shall be treated as the return filed by the taxpayer for purposes of determining the amount of the addition under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a).” [emphasis added]

Form 13496 (rev 02-2009) subscribed, not under penalty of perjury, by revenue agent Michael Sumner [ID# 1001721850], dated 12/01/2016 was knowingly deposited with the US Postal Service or any private or commercial interstate carrier with the intent to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon.

18 U.S. Code Sec. 1341 states in part, “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, ...shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” [emphasis added]

At best this demonstrates bad faith with evil intent, at worse, it is fraud.

26 USC Sec. 6020(b)(2) states, “Any return so made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes.”


Page 4 of 11

There is no physical 6020(b) “substitute for return” made or properly subscribed. I suspect it is nothing more than a machine entry that consists of a code to trick/freeze IRS computers into accepting a manual entry (fraudulent data) generating a tax liability defiency where no tax liability existed prior to the machine entry, however, I cannot specifically evidence that because Respondent has refused Petitioner's multiple requests for the IMF MCC Transcript Complete (master file). Bad faith?

A certification of a thing is not the thing itself.

While 26 USC Sec. 6020(b)(2) states, “Any return so made and subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes.”  It is impossible that a non existent virtual “return” can be good and sufficient for all legal purposes "at first look," or "on its face," as it has no face and cannot be looked at. 26 USC Sec. 6020(b)(2) makes no accomodation for a certificate in substitute of the “return,” which would make it a substitute for a substitute. 

The corresponding enforcement regulations for 26 USC 6651 is 27 CFR Part 24,25 & 70. 26 USC Sec. 6651- Failure to file tax return or to pay tax (a)(2) states that, “to pay the amount shown as tax on any return specified in paragraph (1)…” and section 6651(a)(3) states, “to pay any amount in respect of any tax required to be shown on a return specified in paragraph (1)…” However, 6651 paragraph (1) clearly pertains to liability created by regulation. Regulation applies to those in a regulated activity of tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, and cigarette papers and tubes or distilled spirits, wines, and beer or machine guns and certain other firearms and to those voluntarily engaged in those regulated activities 27 CFR may be considered administrative law. Francis Steffan Hayes is not, nor has been, in no way involved in any of those regulated taxable activities or exercise of a granted privilege subject to regulation under 27 CFR – Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms.

The Commissioner must establish “some evidentiary foundation” connecting the taxpayer to the income-producing activity, Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’g 67 T.C. 672 (1977)

Respondent claims that it will satisfy its burden of production by introducing into evidence the Substitute for Returns prepared by respondent pursuant to I.R.C. § 6020(b) for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. These returns are treated as returns filed by petitioners for purposes of imposing the addition to tax under I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2). I.R.C. § 6651(g); see Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120T.C. 163 (2003).

 
There is no law or regulation that applies to Petitioner being required to keep or maintain records against his will, because if there was a created duty to perform, without the consent of petitioner, it would constitute a situation of involuntary indentured servitude, slavery in other words. For example, Respondent posts this on their website [https://www.jobs.irs.gov/resources/job-descriptions/mail-and-file-clerk], “Full time and seasonal Mail and File Clerk opportunities are available for individuals with the ability to perform such tasks as maintaining records and other documents, processing outgoing mail, and following up on shipments to ensure delivery.”[emphasis added] The Grade/Pay level for this role is GS-3. Starting salary for a GS-3 employee is $23,045.00 per year at Step 1, with a maximum possible base pay of $29,957.00 per year at Step 10. Yet Respondent seems to believe Petionioner should be forced into  maintaining records and other documents for free, against his will, for them or Petitioner will be punished with erroneous liability claims with no ability to defend himself as the courts have decided that the burden of proof is on the accused in tax matters. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Tax Court Rule of Practice and Procedure 142(a).

Page 5 of 11

Petitioner has not agreed to be under any duty to perform any act found in 26 USC or 27 CFR.

The Commissioner must establish “some evidentiary foundation” connecting the taxpayer to the income-producing activity, Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’g 67 T.C. 672 (1977) As decided by the supreme court in Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka they state that, “income” is something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.” Like the activities found in the controlling regulations for 26 USC Sec. 6020(b) found at 27 CFR Part 53 & 70, to which Petitioner is not engaged.

26 USC Sec. 1 imposes a tax upon “taxable income,” a term defined in 26 USC Sec. 63(a) as, “Except as provided in subsection (b), for purposes of this subtitle, the term “taxable income” means gross income minus the deductions allowed by this chapter (other than the standard deduction).”Gross income”, is a term defined in 26 USC Sec. 61(a) as, “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:”[emphasis added] Since “income” is undefined and undefinable from within any legislative action as it is a constitutional term and can only be legislatively defined by an amendment to the United States constitution, the imposition in 26 USC Sec. 1 is a purported tax imposed on something whose nature is unknown in US constitution or current statute and therefore renders the statute/code vague and ambiguous circular rhetoric, a nullity and void.

Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.”  EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)

However, The United States Supreme Court has in fact defined “income,” several times. It is understood by Petitioner that the US Tax Court is subject to obey the decisions of the United States Supreme Court/ Supreme Court of the United States. “The act employs the term "income" in its natural and obvious sense, as importing something distinct from principal or capital, and conveying the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.” “Certainly the term 'income' has no broader meaning in the Revenue Act of 1913 than in that of 1909…” Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918) Petitioner is not nor has been engaged in any corporate activity. “...income is essentially a gain or profit, in itself, of exchangeable value, proceeding from capital, severed from it, and derived or received by the taxpayer for his separate use, benefit, and disposal.” EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) There is no gain or profit from an equal exchange. “Income, within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Income Tax Act of 1913, 1916, 1917, and the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, is a gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets.” “Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of ‘income,’ it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.”Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) Any thing derived from another thing is not the original thing it is derived from, no more than gasoline being derived from crude oil is crude oil. It is self evident and settled law that “reasonable compensation for labor or services rendered is not profit." Oliver v Halsted, 86 SE Rep. 2nd 85e9 (1955) “The Sixteenth Amendment declares that Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes on income, 'from whatever source derived' without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. 

Page 6 of 11

It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power. Congress already had power to tax all incomes.” “Income has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 (36 Stat. 112) in the 16th Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed.”  Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926) All income tax acts under Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code are based on the above, and are classified by the Supreme Court in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) as indirect taxes, which means they can only be excise taxes on privileges and may only fall on coporate activity. “... [the 16th Amendment] conferred no new power of taxation... [and]... prohibited the ... power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the be ginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged...” Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916)

The Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation.

The Sixteenth Amendment created no new subjects of taxation.  

U.S. Congressional constitutional authority to write tax law is found at Art I, Sec.8 Constitution of the United States.

The Sixteenth Amendment has no enactment / enabling clause. 

No legislative act of congress can rely on the Sixteenth Amendment for its authority or enactment.

The labor of a man is not a commodity or article of commerce. 15 U.S. Code Sec. 17

The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14, 59 L.Ed. 441, L.R.A. 1915C, 960, 35 S.Ct.Rep. 240

There is more than one legal definition and entity called, United States. It is a FACT that within the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States it refers to “United States” as a singular entity. It is a FACT that within the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States it refers to “United States” as a plural entity. It is clear using the construction of the law and reason that this was done for purpose. The thirteenth amendment was freeing the slaves and Congress wanted this done within the boundaries of every sovereign State of the perpetual union, “their” jurisdictions. On the other hand, the fourteenth amendment was designed to create a new national citizenship in order to further diminish States rights and increase “federal” power, arguing the purported intentions of creating a citizenship for freed slaves, no one can argue the result, State’s rights have been diminished and federal power have been immensely expanded. “The United States of America” is the “style” or phrase that is used to describe the perpetual Union formed legally by the Articles of Confederation among the several sovereign States. The Articles clearly distinguished “United States of America” from “United States” in Congress assembled. The States formally delegated certain powers to the federal government, which is clearly identified in those Articles as the “United States”. Therefore, the “United States of America” refers to the fifty sovereign States of the perpetual Union, and the term “United States” refers, in one instance, to the federal government. In addition, the supreme court has ruled there is more than one “United States,” “The term ‘United States’ may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution,” Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt 324 U.S. 652 (1945)

Page 7 of 11

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) – We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own ….U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) – One may be a citizen of a State and yet not a citizen of the United States. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (17 Am. R. 738); McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507; In Re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443.McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320, 323 (1883) – That there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities of one are not the same as the other is well established by the decisions of the courts of this country. Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236 (1927) – The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens. [See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).] Instead, this provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship. Jones v. Temmer, 829 F.Supp. 1226 (USDC/DCO 1993)

Francis Steffan does not claim nor accept U.S. Citizenship as created by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This declaration relies upon US Supreme Court determinations which cannot be determined “frivolous.” 

As with the term “income,” the term “United States” is also used within the text of the United States constitution and therefore is forbidden to be defined by congress within legislation unless defined as found within the constitution or by constitutional amendment. 26 USC defines “United States” several different ways, none of which is “as defined in the United States constitution at Article XXX, Section XX, Clause X.” This would seem to make any statute/code that relies on any legislative or administrative definition of “United States” not found within the United States constitution a nullity and void from its inception, If in fact “the code” purporting to create a tax liability is public law and not regulatory administrative law that people become subject to based on their voluntary exercise of certain activities and/or privileges that are regulated and taxed.

The term “State” is defined at 26 U.S. Code Sec. 4482(c)(1), among other places as, The term “State” means a State and the District of Columbia. It is clear that the District of Columbia is not a sovereign “State” of the perpetual union. However, defining “State” as a “State” is not a definition by any standard. It is merely nonsensical circular rhetoric, which by nature makes it vague and ambiguous along with any statute/code it is utilized in. Furthermore, the term “State” is also found within the text of the United States constitution and therefore is forbidden to be differently defined by congress within legislation than what is found within the constitution. It would seem to make any statute/code that relies on any legislative or administrative definition of “State” not synonymous with a meaning of “State” found within the text of The United States constitution a nullity and void from its inception.

The term “Resident” is not found defined within 26 UCS.

As there appears to be no definition within 26 USC for “resident,” and IRS has refused to define what they mean by “resident,” even though Petitioner has requested that information numerous times. Therefore, as dealings between “States” are considered “foreign,” as is dealings between the several sovereign States of the perpetual union and the federal government represented as Distric of Columbia, petitioner will rely on the definition from international law; RESIDENT, international law. The resident does not represent the prince's person in his dignity, but only his affairs. 

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His representation is in reality of the same nature as that of the envoy; hence he is often termed, as well as the envoy, a minister of the second order, thus distinguishing only two classes of public ministers, the former consisting of ambassadors who are invested with the representative character in preeminence, the latter comprising all other ministers, who do not possess that exalted character. This is the most necessary distinction, and indeed the only essential one. Vattel liv. 4, c. 6, 73.  And, “Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take up a permanent abode in the country.” The Law of Nations, Vattel, Book 1, Chapter 19, Section 213, p. 87 which is given legislative deference at Article 1, Section 8, Clause 10 in the Constitution of the United States. As we can see, “resident” is simply one more derivative of a man and Francis Steffan is a man not a derivative of a man or an “alien” within the sovereign States of the perpetual union, The State of Oregon, in any way and therefore is not “resident.”

We live in a country that claims it affords “equal protection under the law.” The same nation allows people born with functioning male genitalia to claim they are female, because they say so, with no evidence justifying that claim, in fact the evidence disputes the claim and are protected in this claim by the courts. Francis Steffan must certainly be afforded the same protections to determine who and what he is, without being deemed frivolous and punished, in this nation of equal protection under the law.

Francis Steffan is a man created, not evolved, in the image of God as evidenced at Genesis 1 verse 27-28 of the Holy Bible, “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them...and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.”

Francis Steffan at all times fully exercises his right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience and no law prohibiting the free exercise of that right may be enacted, The State of Oregon constitution Article I, Section 2 & 3 and The United States constitution Amendment I.

Francis Steffan is not an animal. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g), 15 USC Sec. 55 & 21 USC 379e; “man or other animals,” 7 U.S.C sec. 136; “The term “animal” means all vertebrate and invertebrate species, including but not limited to man and other mammals, birds, fish, and shellfish;” 21 CFR 510.3 (g) “The term new animal drug means any drug intended for use for animals other than man…,”

Francis Steffan is not an “evolved man” or any other kind of animal man or person, individual or human. Early 13c., from Old French persone “human being, anyone, person” (12c., Modern French personne) and directly from Latin persona “human being, person, personage; a part in a drama, assumed character,” originally “a mask, a false face,” such as those of wood or clay worn by the actors in later Roman theater. OED offers the general 19c. explanation of persona as “related to” Latin personare “to sound through” (i.e. the mask as something spoken through and perhaps amplifying the voice), “but the long o makes a difficulty ….” Klein and Barnhart say it is possibly borrowed from Etruscan phersu “mask.” Klein goes on to say this is ultimately of Greek origin and compares Persephone.

Individual is a "single object or thing," c. 1600, from individual (adj.). Meaning "a single human being" (as opposed to a group, etc.) is from 1640s. Colloquial sense of "person" is attested from 1742. Latin individuum as a noun meant "an atom, indivisible particle," and in Middle English individuum was used in sense of "individual member of a species" (early 15c.). “Individual” does not specify what particular species.

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In legal use, “corporate body or corporation having legal rights,” 15c., short for person aggregate (c. 1400), person corporate (mid-15c.). Petitioner is not a human being, not putting on a false face, not wearing a mask, not speaking through a mask to amplify, and not corporate.

Human; mid-15c., humain, humaigne, "human," from Old French humain, umain (adj.) "of or … belonging to man" (12c.), from Latin humanus "of man, human," also "humane, philanthropic, kind, gentle, polite.

As we can clearly see a person is a derivative representation of a man figuratively wearing a mask or other entity such as a corporation, but not a man made in God's image and that an individual is simply a singular instance of a person and that a human is a creature of man but not man himself, a derivative of man. 
Francis Steffan is a natural born inhabitant of The United States of America, a perpetual union, solely based on his physical delivery into the geograhic area of one of the sovereign States of the aforementioned perpetual union.

Francis Steffan is one of the People as described in The Constitution of the State of Oregon and, based only on that status, also one of the People referred in The Constitution of the United States of America.

Francis Steffan is a beneficiary of the trust, The Constitution of the State of Oregon and, based only on that status, also a beneficiary to the trust, The Constitution of the United States of America.

Francis Steffan or his possessions are not surety.

Francis Steffan directs the fiduciary to execute the trust(s) on his behalf, for his benefit, now.

Francis Steffan is not within a federal territory.

Francis Steffan is not “employed.”

Francis Steffan holds no business license.

Francis Steffan has a Right to contract without impairment. “No state shall... pass any... law impairing the obligation of contracts...” US Constitution Article 1, Sec. 10, Clause 1;  

Francis Steffan is not an employee.

Francis Steffan is not an employer.

Francis Steffan receives no “wages.” 

Francis Steffan is not a "Withholding Agent" 




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CONCLUSION

Respondent appears to have targeted Petitioner based on Petitioners associations and Petitioners viewpoint or ideology. Respondent has refused to provide requested documentation, primarily the IMF MCC Transcript Complete (master file). Respondent waited nearly a year and one half since Petition was filed to start dumping documents on Pettitioner, none of which he requested. Respondent suggested a meeting with only three days notice and when Petitoner suggested another day and time Respondent refused and now paints Petitioner in the false light of not cooperating. Respondent is filing frivolous purported “returns” that have no “under penaltly of purjury” jurat which makes them a “nullity,”and misleading and false reprentations of United States Code in an effort to mislead Petitioner on it's face. The actual 6020(b) “substitute for return” is not made or subscribed properly as it does not exist in reality and is simply a machine entry perhaps used as a device to manually enter fraudulent data into the master file simulating a tax liability where none existed. Forms 1040 and 13496 are not listed in IRM 5.1.11.6.7 and therfore cannot be  prepared, signed and executed by revenue officers under the authority of IRC 6020(b). The enforcement regulations/administrative law that operates under 26 USC Sec. 6020 is 27 CFR. Petitioner is not subject to 27 CFR as Petitoner is not voluntarily engaged in any regulated and taxable activity controlled under that body of regulation/administrative law. There are other issues that are addressed within the body of this memo. Respondent has acted continuously in bad faith. Petitioner has no tax liability under past and current conditions.

Petitioner
Francis Steffan
On The Twenty Third Day of November
In The Year of Our Lord Two Thousand Eighteen

__________________________

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